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Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll
Mimi Samuelt
INTRODUCTION
In his classic How to Pick a Jury, legendary trial lawyer
Clarence Darrow advised young attorneys on how to use their
peremptory challenges effectively to choose a jury sympathetic to their
client. Among other pieces of advice, he exhorts members of the defense
bar to choose an Englishman over an Irishman and a Catholic over a
Presbyterian or a Baptist. He warns against choosing a Lutheran,
especially a Scandinavian. And of the Unitarians, Universalists,
Congregationalists, and "other agnostics," he recommends keeping them,
but not asking too many questions. Finally, he cautions that women take
their newly granted privilege of jury service too seriously, and thus, he
feels lucky that his "services were almost over when women invaded the
jury box."'
Publicly promoting such blatant dependence on stereotype may
seem shocking to contemporary attorneys. However, many attorneys
continue to consider these characteristics to be useful predictors of a
potential juror's inherent biases and predilections. As a result, many
attorneys still use peremptory strikes to remove prospective jurors based
on characteristics such as race, gender, religion, and national origin.2 In
fact, a 2005 survey revealed that every lawyer interviewed considered
race and gender when picking a jury. Indeed, although they recognized
that such strikes are impermissible, lawyers listed some of the following
stereotypes that they rely on in jury selection: "Asians are conservative.
African-Americans distrust cops. Latins are emotional. Jews are
sentimental. Women are hard on women . ." Moreover, a recent
psychological study reveals that attorneys rely on race in exercising
t Mimi Samuel is a Legal Writing Professor at Seattle University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Professors John Mitchell, Anne Enquist, and Laurel Oates for their
critiques of drafts of this Article. In addition, the author would like to thank her research assistants,
Shane Yelish, Amy Worrell-Kneller, and J. Dylan Doty, for their able assistance.
I Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense: How to Pick a Jury, ESQUIRE MAG., May
1936, reprinted in Arthur and Lila Weinberg, CLARENCE DARROW, VERDICTS OUT OF COURT 316-
17 (Ivan R. Dee, Inc 1989).
2 Leonard Post, A Loaded Box of Stereotypes, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25, 2005, at 18
3 Id.
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peremptory challenges even when they do not admit (or may not even
consciously acknowledge) that they are doing so. 4
It was not until forty years ago that the Supreme Court first
declared that racial discrimination in jury selection was impermissible,
but then only if the offending attorney was found to engage in a pattern
of discrimination: a single instance of discrimination was not sufficient.'
However, in 1986, the Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky,6
holding that a defendant may show discrimination in the selection of the
jury in his case alone; he need not prove that the prosecutor consistently
engages in discrimination.7 When such a claim of discrimination is
raised, Batson requires that the trial court engage in a three-step burden-
shifting analysis to assess the claim of discrimination.8 Under the burden-
shifting scheme, the party opposing the strike must first make out a
prima facie case of discrimination.9 After doing so, the proponent of the
strike must come forward with a racially neutral reason." Finally, the
trial court has "the duty to determine if the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination.""
While Batson provides broad and admirable protections, from
the outset critics of the decision have expressed skepticism and concern
both about Batson's theoretical underpinnings 2 and also about the
workability of the scheme set down by the Supreme Court for a trial
judge to assess claims of discrimination. 3 This Article will focus on the
latter: the practical problem of evaluating and resolving Batson
challenges at the trial and appellate levels.
4 Samuel R. Summers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge Procedure,
31 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 261,263 (2007).
5 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
6 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7 Id. at 95.
8 Id. at 96.
9 Id. at 96-97.
10 Id. at 97.
11 Id. at 98.
12 At a theoretical level, the rule set down in Batson is problematic in that it gives
attorneys conflicting signals about the propriety of using intangible factors in deciding which jurors
to strike. As will be discussed in Part IA, infra, historically trial attorneys were permitted to exercise
peremptory challenges for any reason or no reason at all. Thus, attorneys could and would use
hunches, instincts, and feelings to justify their strikes. Those hunches, instincts, and feelings could
be based on a wide array of intangibles including eye contact (or lack thereof), tone of voice, and
demeanor. But because the trial attorney was not required to justify her strikes, these reasons were
never announced in court and were, therefore, not subject to scrutiny. However, after Batson,
attorneys may be asked to explain and justify their reasons for a peremptory challenge. And, as a
result, intangible reasons that have been and continue to be legitimate bases for striking jurors may
now be seen as suspect. Therefore, without explicitly doing so, Batson may constrain attorneys' use
of hunches, instincts, or feelings as a basis for peremptory strikes, particularly when exercising
strikes against people of color or against women, effectively limiting the use of what is generally
considered an important tool in arriving at an impartial jury.
13 See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-44 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-07 (Marshall, J., concurring).
[Vol. 74:1
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Of course, no one knows exactly what goes on in an attorney's
mind (and the attorney herself might not even know what goes on in her
subconscious): it is impossible to effectively police intentional or
unintentional discrimination that motivates or informs decisions to strike
a prospective juror based on hunch, instinct, or feeling. Thus, some
might argue that Batson is not really intended to eliminate discrimination
in jury selection-that such a goal might be admirable but not
necessarily achievable. That is, the argument goes, Batson's function is
to let attorneys know that intentional discrimination is not acceptable
behavior; Batson only sets up a moral or ethical worldview and an
aspirational goal. 4 And while this view might satisfy some critics, it is
not likely to satisfy litigants who believe that they were judged by a jury
tainted by discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Nor is it likely to
satisfy judges who have been charged with assessing the validity of the
reasons for the strikes.
Proposed solutions to the problems with Batson range from
abandoning Batson protections'5 to eliminating the peremptory challenge
entirely'6 to limiting Batson's applicability to criminal trials. 7 However,
assuming that, at least for the time being, both the peremptory challenge
and the protections afforded by Batson are here to stay, 8 this Article
addresses one particular aspect of the Batson process: the assessment of
neutral reasons that rely on intangibles such as eye contact, tone of voice,
demeanor, posture, and laughing or coughing. When attorneys rely on
such reasons, both trial and appellate courts are at a tremendous
14 See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Reports of Batson's Death Have Been Greatly
Exaggerated: How the Batson Doctrine Enforces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP.
L. REv. 607,625 (2005).
15 In arguing that striking jurors based on race should not be prohibited, Justice
Rehnquist noted the following:
The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a "proxy" for potential
juror partiality, based on the assumption or belief that members of one group are more
likely to favor defendants who belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a
legitimate basis for the State's exercise of peremptory challenges.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 60
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring); Brian W. Stoltz, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting
Lawyers Enforce The Principles of Batson, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1044-45 (2007).
See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial
Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 864 (1997). According to Judge Hoffman, one of "the
most remarkable of these judicial criticisms is Judge Bellacosa's concurrence in [People v. Boiling,
591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142-46 (N.Y. 1992)], in which he, joined by two of his colleagues on the New
York Court of Appeals, pleads with the New York legislature to abolish peremptory challenges
entirely." Hoffman, supra, at 810 n.2.
17 See, e.g., Eric D. Katz, Note, Striking the Peremptory Challenge from Civil Litigation:
"Hey Batson, Stay Where You Belong! ", I 1 PACE L. REV. 357,409 (1991).
18 That the majority of the Supreme Court does not intend to abandon the Batson scheme
is underscored in its recent decisions of Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005) and Miller-El,
125 S. Ct. 2317. Although Justice Breyer's concurrence in Miller-El explains why "[t]oday's case
reinforces Justice Marshall's concerns," Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2340, apparently he alone sees the
merit in those concerns. See also Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2419 (Breyer, J., concurring) (adopting
Miller-El concurring opinion).
2008]
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disadvantage when attempting to discern whether the given reasons are
in fact discriminatory because the courts have little or no evidence on
which to rely in assessing the validity of the reason.
The problems with the implementation of the Batson scheme at
the trial level lie in the lack of evidence upon which the trial judge will
base her decision. First, for the scheme to work effectively, the trial
judge is asked, at the end of what may have been a lengthy voir dire
process, to recall the proceedings in their entirety with a degree of detail
that is wholly unrealistic. Thus, after a prosecutor19 sets forth a neutral
reason for the strike, unless the court can recall whether Juror X was or
was not making eye contact with the prosecutor earlier in the day or
whether Juror Y was dozing, fidgeting, or laughing on day two of a four
day voir dire process, then the trial judge has no evidence upon which to
evaluate the prosecutor's credibility. ° Second, as noted in these
hypothetical scenarios, many, if not most, of the neutral reasons given by
prosecutors at the second step of Batson's burden-shifting scheme
involve not what a prospective juror has said in response to voir dire
questions or what a juror has written on a juror questionnaire, but what a
prospective juror has done (or not done) or how a prospective juror has
looked during jury selection.2 Thus, even if a trial judge had access to a
"real time"2 written transcript, that transcript, in so many cases, would
not shed any light on the validity of the prosecutor's neutral reason.
The problems are compounded when an appellate court reviews
the trial judge's decision on pretext,23 as it too lacks evidence to review.24
When the appellate court is limited to reviewing a written transcript,
19 Batson protections apply to all litigants in both civil and criminal proceedings. See
infra note 35 and accompanying text. However, because the issue still arises most frequently in a
criminal trial with a challenge to a prosecution strike, this Article will assume a scenario in which a
defendant raises a Batson challenge to a prosecutor's strike in a criminal case. See James R.
Gadwood, Note, The Framework Comes Crumbling Down: JuryQuest in a Batson World, 88 B.U. L.
REv. 291, 309 n.136 (2008).
20 This problem was pointed out in the Supreme Court's most recent Batson case. In
Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008), the majority noted that it was
possible that the judge did not have any impression one way or the other concerning [the
juror's] demeanor. [The juror] was not challenged until the day after he was questioned,
and by that time dozens of other jurors had been questioned. Thus, the trial judge may not
have recalled [the juror's] demeanor.
128 S. Ct. at 1209.
21 See infra Part II.
22 "Real time" court reporting converts the court reporter's note-taking into words
instantaneously. T. Mundt, Saving Real Time: How Instant Transcription Can Benefit You in the
Courtroom, OR. ST. B. BULL., Aug.-Sept. 1997, at 31. Thus, a judge equipped with a laptop
computer connected to the "real time" system can view the conversion of the spoken word into
written transcript immediately and without leaving the bench. Id.
23 As will be discussed in note 167, infra, the appellate court reviews the trial judge's
decision at the third step of the Batson analysis under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21.
24 See Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1209 (expressing frustration at relying on a "cold transcript"
to assess whether counsel's race-neutral reason of "nervousness" was, in fact, pretextual when the
trial court had not made any findings regarding the prospective juror's demeanor).
(Vol. 74:1
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which does not reflect potential jurors' body language, tone, or other
non-verbal communication, in many instances, the appellate court has no
choice but to act as a rubber-stamp for the trial judge's decision.25
Thus, this Article proposes a practical solution to strengthen the
enforcement mechanism: for the trial court to have sufficient evidence to
adequately assess the validity of a Batson objection and, even more
importantly, for the appellate court to conduct a meaningful review of
that assessment, the courts must review video recordings of the voir dire
proceedings in making their decisions. Granted, use of video is not a
failsafe solution: video is not, in fact, the same as "being there." In
addition, video equipment can malfunction, and videos can be lost or
destroyed just like written transcripts. But using video would have
several benefits: (1) attorneys would know that they were being taped,
thus enhancing Batson's normative value; (2) judges, at both the trial and
appellate levels, would have evidence to use to evaluate attorney
credibility; and (3) litigants, particularly criminal defendants, would have
an increased perception of fairness.
Part I of this Article will review the Batson decision and the
expansion of the scope of its protections. Part II will summarize
criticisms of Batson and its progeny levied by bench, bar, and
commentators. Part III will examine the use of video evidence and video
transcripts in trial and appellate courts and will address some of the
concerns raised regarding the courts' review of videotapes.
Finally, Part IV will argue that for a trial judge to fulfill her
obligations under the third step of the Batson scheme, she must have
evidence of what happened during the voir dire proceedings to assess the
credibility of the proponent of the peremptory strike. Moreover, because
of the peculiar nature of the facts found by the trial judge, to adequately
examine whether the finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the appellate
court must review the same evidence relied upon by the trial judge. This
Article will conclude that, in many cases, the only evidence available to
both the trial and appellate courts is a videotape of the voir dire
25 At least one other commentator has advanced this position:
[V]ideotaped voir dire records could give new life to Batson. In particular, that
technology would permit the appellate court to meaningfully test a prosecutor's claim
that she struck a particular juror based on his demeanor (for example, because the juror
somehow nonverbally communicated hostility, disinterest, sympathy with the defendant,
or stupidity). Without a videotaped record, such claims are completely insulated from
review on appeal. It is not even possible for the defendant to demonstrate "clear error" on
the trial court's part in accepting such a justification, since the written record by its very
nature cannot reflect the presence or absence of such attitudes on the part of the
prospective juror. With a videotaped record, however, the reviewing court could at least
monitor whether some behavior of the juror appeared to be consistent with the
prosecutor's defense.
Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, Thawing Out the "Cold Record": Some Thoughts on How
Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional Standards of Deference on Direct and Collateral
Review, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 411,425 (2000) (footnote omitted).
2008]
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proceedings. Thus, when such video is available, to ensure meaningful
implementation of the constitutional principles underlying the Batson
protections, courts must review those videotapes.
I. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY
This section will provide a brief overview of the Batson decision
and similar decisions that followed. It will then go into more depth
explaining the burden-shifting test that courts must use when evaluating
Batson challenges. Finally, it will explain the standard of review that
appellate courts must use when reviewing trial court decisions on Batson
challenges.
A. Evolution of Batson Protections
The peremptory challenge is deeply rooted in American
jurisprudence.26 A peremptory challenge is distinguished from a
"challenge for cause," which may be exercised when a juror does not
meet the statutory qualifications for jury duty or when a juror is biased
for or against one of the parties or as to the substance of the dispute in
general.27 Traditionally, the peremptory challenge could be exercised to
remove a potential juror for any reason or for no reason at all.28 As noted
in the introduction, historically attorneys used peremptory challenges to
strike prospective jurors for a wide variety of reasons, including but
certainly not limited to, the jurors' race, national origin, ethnicity, and
gender. However, strikes on the basis of race, national origin, ethnicity,
or gender are no longer permissible.29
In Batson, the Court considered whether an African American
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right was violated
when, in a trial for burglary and receipt of stolen goods, the prosecutor
struck the only four black members of the venire.3" Holding that the
defendant's right was violated, the Court noted that the "Equal Protection
Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on
account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group
will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
26 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2483 (3d ed. 2008) ("The use of the peremptory challenge is of ancient origin and is
given to aid each party's interest in a fair and impartial jury.").
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 24-26 (3d ed.
2001).
29 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83 (1986). As will be discussed infra, some federal courts and
some state courts also prohibit strikes based on other discriminatory factors. See supra notes 36-37,
39 and accompanying text.
30 Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
[Vol. 74:1
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defendant."'" Prior to Batson, a defendant could, in fact, claim
discrimination in jury selection, but he had to prove that the prosecutor
engaged in a pattern of discrimination over time, not just in an individual
act of discrimination in his case.32 However, even after Batson,
protections against discrimination in jury selection were limited. Only
racial discrimination was prohibited, and even then, a defendant could
only challenge a prosecutor's peremptory strikes when both the
defendant and the stricken jurors belonged to the same racial group.33
Over time, Batson's protections have grown. First, as the Court
recognized that discrimination in jury selection infringes on the rights of
jurors as much as on the rights of the defendant, it eliminated the
requirement that the defendant be a member of a cognizable racial group
and that the stricken jurors be members of that same group.' Thus, a
white juror could object if she believed that the prosecutor unfairly
struck black jurors from the panel. Second, the protections against
discrimination were expanded to limit defendants in criminal cases from
engaging in discrimination in selection as well as limiting plaintiffs and
defendants in civil cases.35 Third, the types of discrimination prohibited
have expanded. While Batson itself was limited to protecting black
defendants from discriminatory strikes against black jurors, the Court
expanded that protection to prohibit discrimination against any racial
group.36 It then expanded the protection to prohibit discrimination based
on gender.37 And, while the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand
Batson's protections further,38 some lower federal courts and state courts
have done so, for example, by prohibiting peremptory strikes based on
religious affiliation and sexual orientation. "
31 Id. at 89. The court specifically declined to express a view on whether the same rule
applies to challenges by defense counsel. Id. at 89 n. 12.
32 Id. at 89-94.
33 Id. at 96.
34 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,409 (1991).
35 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
36 Powers, 499 U.S. at 423.
37 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
38 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1115
(1994) (denying certiorari to determine whether Batson prohibits discrimination on the basis of
religious affiliation).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 669 (2d Cir. 2003) (prohibiting
discrimination based on religious affiliation); People v. Garcia, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 347 (Ct. App.
2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation). But see, e.g., United States v.
Girouard, 521 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2008) (whether Batson protections extend to cases of religious
discrimination is an open question in the First Circuit); United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774,
781-82 (8th Cir. 2005) (whether Batson protections extend to cases of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is an open question in the Eighth Circuit); United States v. Santiago-Martinez, 58
F.3d 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1995) (declining to extend Batson protection to obese persons); United States
v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259, 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (declining to extend Batson protection to young
adults).
2008]
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B. The Burden-Shifting Scheme
In assessing whether an attorney has violated Batson, the court
must engage in the following burden-shifting analysis.
1. The First Step: The Prima Facie Case
First, the party claiming a Batson violation must make out a
prima facie case. Originally, to make out a prima facie case of
discrimination under Batson, the defendant had to show (1) that he was a
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor struck
venire members from the defendant's race, and (2) any other relevant
circumstances that raised an inference of discrimination.' The defendant
could also "rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate.' '"41 Some of the relevant circumstances that could
raise an inference of discrimination include: (1) a pattern of strikes
against black jurors, and (2) the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire.a" The Court, however, declined to set out an exhaustive
list of circumstances, noting that it had "confidence that trial judges,
experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the
circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors."43
2. The Second Step: The Race-Neutral Reason
If the court finds that a prima facie case has been established,
then the proponent of the strike must come forward with a race-neutral
reason for the strike. The Court noted that this requirement, in fact,
"imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of
the historic challenge," but emphasized that the neutral reason need not
rise to the level of a challenge for cause.' With the Court's decision in
Purkett v. Elem, the burden on the proponent of the strike at this stage
became even lower.45 To meet its burden at the second step of the Batson
scheme, the reason need only be neutral on its face. So long as it meets
this requirement, it does need not to be "persuasive, or even plausible."'
Even a "silly or superstitious" reason may rebut the prima facie case. 7
40 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
41 Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
42 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) ("[I]mplausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably
will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.").
46 Id. at 768.
47 Id.
[Vol. 74:1
HeinOnline  -- 74 Brook. L. Rev. 102 2008-2009
FOCUS ON BATSON
3. The Third Step: Determining Pretext
Finally, the trial court must assess the validity of the neutral
reason to determine whether it is, in fact, pretext for purposeful
discrimination. Notably, in Batson, the Supreme Court provided no
guidance to the trial courts as to how to make this determination. Indeed,
the Court declined to formulate any procedures to be followed, noting the
"variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and federal trial
courts .... .,'I To date, the Court has declined to provide guidance to
lower courts.4 9 As a result, "[i]neffective scrutiny of prosecution
explanations is the single greatest problem hindering the effective
implementation of Batson .... [C]ourts are having an extremely difficult
time distinguishing between legitimate reasons for the use of peremptory
challenges and mere excuses or pretexts for discrimination."5
C. Standard of Review on Appeal
If a trial court's decision on a Batson challenge is reviewed on
appeal, the finding of purposeful discrimination in jury selection is a
finding of fact to be reviewed for clear error. "Since the trial judge's
findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on
evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those
findings great deference."5 The Court later explained that "[iun the
typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be
whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge
should be believed."52 However, the Court noted that "[tihere will
seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue and the best evidence
48 Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n.24.
49 See Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory
Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 171 & n.78 (2005).
50 Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A Promise
Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REV. 361, 369 (1990).
51 Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21 (1986); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
364 (1991) (plurality opinion) ("Batson's treatment of intent to discriminate as a pure issue of fact,
subject to review under a deferential standard, accords with our treatment of that issue in other equal
protection cases."). The inability of courts to adequately define the clear error standard of review has
been the subject of much criticism. See Bryan L. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
as an Ideological Weapon?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1025, 1051-53 (2007). The most commonly
accepted definition provides that "clear error exists where 'although there is evidence to support' a
district court's factual findings, the appellate court, 'on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."' Id. at 1051 (quoting United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Put in the negative, an appellate court can find clear error
and overturn a trial court's finding of fact if it was "without adequate evidentiary support" or
"without substantial support." Id. at 1052 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Despite
these definitions, the standard has been deemed "elastic, capricious, malleable, and above all
variable" and "at best, a nebulous concept." Id. at 1051 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Indeed, at least one commentator has questioned why this standard is used in the Batson
context when "constitutional facts" are traditionally reviewed under a de novo standard. Id. at 1063-
65. That issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
52 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
20081
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often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the
challenge."53 As a result of this deferential standard, it appears that trial
courts' decisions on Batson challenges are rarely overturned.'
II. CRITICISM OF THE BATSON SCHEME
The Batson scheme has been criticized since its inception.
Courts, litigants, and commentators have criticized it as difficult to
implement and ineffective in protecting the rights granted to litigants and
jurors by Batson and its progeny. Many courts are frustrated with their
inability to second-guess the reasons behind an attorney's race-neutral
reason given at the second step of the analysis, and empirical studies bear
out that many of these reasons are difficult, if not virtually impossible, to
assess given that they rest on intangible factors such as a juror's tone of
voice, demeanor, or eye contact with the attorney.5 Indeed, several
litigants have argued that they should be entitled to a videotape of the
voir dire proceedings to make a record of these intangible factors. 6 And
some critics are so frustrated that they call for the elimination of
peremptory challenges altogether.57
First, judges have expressed concerns about their ability to
effectively assess the validity of a prosecutor's reason for striking a juror.
In his concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall foresaw the inherent
difficulties in determining whether a facially neutral reason was, in fact,
pretextual.58 Noting the very low standard at the second step of the
scheme, Justice Marshall concluded that any prosecutor can easily assert
53 Id. (emphasis added).
54 See, e.g., Amanda S. Hitchcock, "Deference Does Not by Definition Preclude Relief':
The Impact of Miller-El v. Dretke on Batson Review in North Carolina Capital Appeals, 84 N.C. L.
REv. 1328, 1328-29 (2006); Paul H. Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The
Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1991).
55 See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2340-41 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring);
Page, supra note 49, at 178-79 n.102 (collecting fourteen articles criticizing Batson's ability to
eliminate discrimination in jury selection).
56 See supra note 88.
57 See, e.g., Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2344 ("1 believe it necessary to reconsider Batson's
test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole."); Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into
the jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely."); see also Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 &
n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussed infra notes 63, 87); Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001) (Meyers, J., concurring) ("Time has proven Justice Marshall right, and today I
register my agreement with the growing ranks of other jurists and commentators who have come to
the same conclusion."); Page, supra note 49, at 245-46 (advocating elimination of the peremptory
challenge); Adam Liptak, Oddity in Picking Jurors Opens Door to Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2007, at A 12.
58 Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-06 (The Batson scheme is not workable because (1)
defendants can only establish a prima facie case when the evidence of discrimination is flagrant; (2)
even if a prima facie case is established, the trial court faces the "difficult burden of assessing the
prosecutors' motives"; and (3) discriminatory effect may not necessarily result from the prosecutor's
intent as much as from her conscious or unconscious racism.).
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a reason that is neutral on its face, and "trial courts are ill equipped to
second-guess those reasons."59 He continued:
How is the court to treat a prosecutor's statement that he struck a juror
because the juror had a son about the same age as [the] defendant, or seemed
uncommunicative, or never cracked a smile and[,] therefore, did not possess
the sensitivities necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts
in this case? If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to discharge
the prosecutor's obligation to justify his strikes on nonracial grounds, then the
protection erected by the Court today may be illusory.6o
Justice Breyer, in the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement on
Batson, echoed these concerns.61 He, however, was alone in venting his
frustrations with the Batson scheme.62
Nonetheless, lower courts have also expressed frustration with
attempts to implement Batson:
Time has proven Mr. Justice Marshall correct. Ten frustrating years have now
passed since the Supreme Court's decision in Batson. . . . All peremptory
challenges should now be banned as an unnecessary waste of time and an
obvious corruption of the judicial process. Such a change would have the added
benefit of putting an end to the awkward analyses set forth in Batson and its
progeny[,] which have proved over ten years to be uncertain in their application
and which have caused great consternation in the courts.
6 3
In particular, courts have expressed concerns about the ability to
adequately review the validity of neutral reasons based on non-verbal
factors.' For example, in a prosecution for possession of cocaine, the
prosecution struck all six black venirepersons out of a panel of thirty-
three.65 In response to the defendant's Batson challenge, the prosecution
offered that it struck three of the African American jurors because they
were "inattentive."' In affirming the district court's denial of the
challenge, the Eighth Circuit noted its concerns about the "generalities"
59 Id. at 106.
60 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
61 Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2340-44.
62 Id.
63 Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Meyers, J., concurring) ("Batson and
its progeny, have made a further muck of things by transforming voir dire into a lengthy ordeal
involving inquires into inappropriate questions of race and ethnicity that not only have nothing to do
with impartiality, but will also become increasingly muddled in the face of our changing society.").
6 Non-verbal communication includes a wide array of behaviors including inflection,
tone of voice, speech pauses, yawns, facial expressions, head nods, eye contact, squinting, arm and
hand gestures, slouching, and other body movements. See generally Rebecca White Berch, A
Proposal to Amend Rule 30(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Cross-Disciplinary and
Empirical Evidence Supporting Presumptive Use of Video to Record Depositions, 59 FORDHAM L.
REv. 347, 360-68 (1990); Rochelle L. Shoretz, Note, Let the Record Show: Modifying Appellate
Review Procedures for Errors of Prejudicial Nonverbal Communication by Trial Judges, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 1273, 1275-81 (1995).
65 United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393, 394 (8th Cir. 1991). One of the black jurors
was struck for cause, and the other five were struck peremptorily. Id.
66 ..
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of an explanation such as inattentiveness, explaining that "[d]etermining
who is and is not attentive requires subjective judgments that are
particularly susceptible to the type of abuse prohibited by Batson."67
Moreover, "[tihis difficulty is compounded by the need to compare the
attentiveness of the challenged venire members with those who were not
challenged."68 The court cautioned the trial court to give "careful
scrutiny" to challenges based on subjective grounds such as
inattentiveness and admonished counsel to fully develop the record
concerning the specific behavior by venire members at issue.69
Though lower courts have expressed their dissatisfaction with
the workability of the Batson scheme, the Supreme Court shows no sign
of discarding or even modifying the scheme.7" Indeed, it reaffirmed its
adherence to the Batson principles and methodologies in two recent
cases." And, in both of those cases, it was only Justice Breyer who
expressed his belief that the result in those cases "reinforces Justice
Marshall's concerns. 72
Second, empirical analyses demonstrate that Justices Marshall's
and Breyer's concerns have been borne out. These empirical studies
support the notion that Batson challenges have had limited effectiveness
in reducing the number of race and gender based peremptory
challenges.73 As one such study concluded: "Several reasons may be
impeding the effectiveness of Batson, including the presumption of
proper discretionary use of the peremptory privilege by attorneys and
blithe acceptance of doubtful race-neutral reasons by the trial courts.
74
The studies indicate that an ultimate finding of race or gender
discrimination and a grant of relief for such discrimination is infrequent
67 Id. at 395.
68 Id.
69 Id. Interestingly, the defendant in this case argued that the prosecutor's claim that a
juror was inattentive "cannot be refuted without a complete record of the voir dire, such as a video
tape, in order to determine whether white venire members were similarly inattentive." Id. While the
Eighth Circuit noted this argument, it nonetheless did not address the merits of it. Id.; see also
United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1466 (8th Cir. 1994) (admonishing counsel to fully develop the
trial record regarding observations of behavior that form the basis of neutral strikes).
70 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2419 (2005); Miller-El v. Dretke, 125
S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (2005).
71 Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2419; Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2331-32.
72 Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2340 (Breyer, J., concurring).
73 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 127 (2001) (analysis of 317 capital
murder cases tried by jury in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in
Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 447, 448-49 (1996) (undertaking a survey of Batson, McCollum, and J.E.B. claims in state and
federal courts); Eric N. Einhom, Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is
The Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REv. 161, 200 (1994) (analysis of 113
federal appellate decisions involving Batson claims).
Oluseyi Olubadewo, Racial Profiling in Jury Selection: The Third Circuit Revisits the
Batson Inquiry in Riley v. Taylor, 47 VILL. L. REv. 1195, 1201 (2002).
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at best.75 While a prima facie case of discrimination is often found by the
court, only a small percentage of the race-neutral explanations for
peremptory strikes are rejected.76 Frequently, the rejected explanations
concern the clearest cases of Batson violations, such as when the
prosecutor provides a race-based reason77 or no reason at all.78
The problem, in large part, lies in the fact that many, if not most,
of the neutral reasons given for striking a juror are based on non-verbal
communication or appearance.79 In only 10% of 632 cases reviewed in
one study did the trial court find that a prosecutor's neutral reason was
not supported by the record.8" Another study of 3,898 cases analyzed the
most popular categories of accepted peremptory challenges. Of the
sixteen categories seen, behavior during voir dire was the second most-
accepted reason by courts for a justified peremptory challenge.81 The
study further broke this category into fifteen subcategories, with
"inattentive" as the most common reason accepted as a peremptory
challenge.8 2 Finally, a study of 532 cases found that personal appearance
was successfully used to justify a peremptory challenge in ninety-five
cases.
83
75 Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 235-37 (1993) (examination of 824 state
and federal Batson cases decided through the first five years of Batson).
76 Melilli, supra note 73, at 478-79 (1996) (in 867 cases, 2994 peremptory challenges
were the subject of neutral explanations, but only 533 [17.80%] were found to violate Batson).
77 Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 75, at 235-36 n.39 (citing Goggins v. State, 529 So.
2d 649, 651-52 (Miss. 1988)).
78 Id. at n.40 (citing United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1987)).
79 Of course, relying on non-verbal factors is not in itself inherently suspect. Any
experienced trial lawyer knows that non-verbal communication is critical, if not paramount, in the
jury selection process. In fact, communications experts commonly assert that more than 50% of
human communication is non-verbal. See, e.g., Jim Goodwin, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying
on Nonverbal Behavioral Cues to Deception to Strike Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
739, 751 n.122 (1996); Edward J. Imwinkelried. Demeanor Impeachment: Law and Tactics, 9 AM.
J.TRIAL ADVOC. 183, 187 (1985).
80 Melilli, supra note 73, at 478-79 (reasons for rejection of facially neutral reasons
include the following: disparate treatment [172 or 27.22%], insufficient voir dire [102 or 16.14%],
no explanation offered [seventy-nine or 12.50%], unsupported by record [sixty-one or 9.65%]).
81 Id. at 485 (prior involvement with criminal conduct or litigation [697 or 17.88%1;
behavior during voir dire [532 or 13.65%]; possession of extrajudicial information or bias [496 or
12.72%]; difficulty following instructions [387 or 9.93%]; Age [343 or 8.80%]; employment or
training [291 or 7.47%]; economic characteristics [233 or 5.98%]; family situation [231 or 5.93%];
education and intelligence [140 or 3.59%]; location of home, workplace or other activities [123 or
3.16%]; incapacity [111 or 2.85%]; personal appearance [95 or 2.44%]; prior jury service [90 or
2.31%]; gender [eighty-two or 2.10%]; miscellaneous characteristics [26 or 0.67%]; neutral
explanation did not involve any objection to the challenged venireperson [21 or 0.54%]).
82 Id. at 488 (inattentive [154 or 28.95%], wished to avoid jury service [75 or 14.10%],
hostile toward the lawyer who later exercised the challenge [59 or 11.09%], responsive to opposing
lawyer or what opposing lawyer said [51 or 9.59%], timid [46 or 8.65%], unfavorable impression
[36 or 6.77%], inattentive to lawyer who later exercised challenge [30 or 5.64%], strange [20 or
3.76%], friendly toward opposing party [18 or 3.38%], answered no voir dire questions [11 or
2.07%], assertive [11 or 2.07%]).
83 Id. at 485; see also Owen & Mather, supra note 25, at 425 n.43 and cases cited therein
(nonverbally communicated hostility, disinterest, sympathy with the defendant, or stupidity are most
commonly cited neutral reasons for striking jurors).
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Another study reviewed 824 cases decided within the first five
years following the Supreme Court's Batson decision.' The study found
that the demeanor of a juror is frequently accepted as a neutral
explanation because the authenticity of many of the demeanor
explanations is completely unverifiable by a judge. 85 The study found
that jurors were dismissed for acting "'totally off the wall' during
questioning, appearing inattentive, strong-willed, headstrong or
opinionated, seeming weak or tentative, nervous, and too casual... [and
displaying] grimaces, sympathetic looks, smiles, nods, and blank
stares."86
Third, some litigants have expressed concerns that their rights to
an impartial jury are not being adequately protected because neither the
trial court nor the appellate court can adequately evaluate the validity of
a prosecutor's race-neutral reason.87 Anticipating problems in the review
of Batson challenges, several criminal defendants have even requested
that the trial court be required to videotape the jury selection process. To
date, however, while appellate courts may recognize the potential value
of having the ability to assess the jurors' demeanors and hear the tones of
their voices, no court has accepted the argument that a criminal
defendant has a right to have the voir dire in his case videotaped.88
While this Article does not adopt the position that litigants have
a right to have their jury selection processes videotaped, it will argue that
84 Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 75, at 234-35.
85 Id. at 246-47.
86 Id. at 248 (quoting State v. Griffin, 563 So. 2d 334, 339 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
87 See, e.g., Minetos v. City Univ. of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
88 See, e.g., Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow videotape of voir dire proceedings because defendant
was not "prevented from attempting to create a record, by other means, of the allegedly hostile
atmosphere" during jury selection); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
(trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to videotape voir dire
proceedings because conduct of voir dire falls largely within the discretion of the trial court); see
also State v. Taylor, 944 S.W.2d 925, 934 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (trial court did not err in denying
motion to videotape voir dire because "[tihere is no requirement that the trial court videotape voir
dire, and this Court declines to impose such a requirement."). In United States v. Sherrills, the
defendant argued that the prosecutor's claim that a juror was inattentive "cannot be refuted without a
complete record of the voir dire, such as a videotape, in order to determine whether white venire
members were similarly inattentive." 929 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1991). While the Eighth Circuit
noted this argument, it nonetheless did not address it on the merits. In a similar case, although the
assignment of error was overruled, the court noted the defendant's "interesting public policy
argument" that would dictate the court videotape voir dire in all capital cases. State v. Joseph, No. 1-
91-11, 1993 WL 531858, at *37 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1993) (overruling assignment of error
because the defendant did not identify any prejudice that he suffered as a result of the denial of
motion) (this case involved a claim of juror bias, not a Batson issue), affd, 653 N.E.2d 285 (Ohio
1995). On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the defendant argued that because, in a capital case,
the appellate court must perform a de novo review of the entire record, without a video of the voir
dire, "the reviewing courts are put in a position of giving deference to a trial court who sees and
hears the juror." Merit Br. of Appellant Richard Joseph at 197, State v. Joseph, 653 N.E.2d 285
(Ohio 1995) (No. 94-372) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And, responding to the
intermediate court's concern that the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice, the defendant
agreed: "That is precisely the point. Absent the benefit of video tape, Appellant is at a fatal
disadvantage in demonstrating that his jurors were biased." Id. at 198.
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when a videotape exists, as is becoming increasingly common in
courtrooms across the country, both trial courts and appellate courts
should review that tape in assessing the initial validity of the Batson
challenge and then in reviewing the trial court's decision on that
challenge. Before explaining in more depth the reasons that support this
position, the next section will review the current use of videotape in both
trial and appellate courts.
II. THE USE OF VIDEO IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS
This section will first briefly review the use of videotape in both
the trial and appellate courts. It will then summarize some of the
criticisms of relying on video, particularly at the appellate level. Next, it
will argue that courts should determine what type of evidence or
information is contained in a video and what type of decision they are
being asked to make before deciding whether to review a video. That is,
courts should not have blanket rules regarding the use of video; instead,
they should consider whether to review video on a case-by-case, or at
least category-by-category, basis.
A. Introduction and Summary of Criticisms
While headlines like "Supreme Court Meets YouTube"89 may be
a bit of an overstatement, in the past four decades the use of video in trial
and appellate courts has exploded.9" And the Supreme Court's recent
reliance on, and hyperlink to, videotaped evidence certainly suggests that
this trend will only continue and expand.9" As commentators have noted,
the increasing availability of videotape and its use in judicial decision-
making "is likely to become a trend": "there will be more cases where
judges at all levels can watch an incident for themselves and come to
their own conclusions about what happened."92 And, of course, this raises
questions about whether and to what extent courts should rely on
videotaped evidence.
Video was first introduced into the courtroom as a method of
presenting evidence at trial, both in lieu of live witness testimony and to
present evidence of underlying events.9" In addition, many trial courts
89 Martha Neil, Supreme Court Meets YouTube: Camera-Shy Justices Hyperlink Video to
Their Car-Crash Opinion, ABA J. E-REPORT, May 4, 2007.
90 See Karen Martin Campbell, Roll Tape-Admissibility of Videotape Evidence in the
Courtroom, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1445, 1482 (1996).
91 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).92 Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on Excessive-Force Claims, TRIAL, July 2007,
at 74.
93 Jordan S. Gruber, Videotape Evidence, 44 AM. JUR. TRIALS 171 § 34 & n.63 (1992)
(citing 1969 article discussing the admissibility of videotape evidence); Ronald K.L. Collins &
David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 509, 537-46 (1992).
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have begun to use "videorecords 94 to replace or to supplement
traditional stenographic records." These videorecords allow the viewer to
review not only the words spoken at trial but also the demeanor, body
language, and tone of the speaker.96 While the value of video in
enhancing the viewer's ability to assess these non-verbal aspects of trial
proceedings has been widely accepted at the trial level, many appellate
judges oppose review of video on appeal.9"
The criticisms of reviewing a videorecord include the obvious
concerns about the reliability of the technology itself.98 In addition,
concerns exist among both courts and counsel about the time necessary
to review video as opposed to a written transcript. 99
The greatest concerns, however, involve the blurring of the line
between the role of the fact-finder and that of the reviewing court." °
94 For purposes of this Article, "videorecord" refers to videotape of court proceedings.
95 For a review of the history and growth of the use of video transcripts, see Georgi-Ann
Oshagan, Note, Videotaped Trial Transcripts and Appellate Review: Are Some Courts Favoring
Form Over Substance?, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 1639, 1640-48 (1992). See generally Don J.
DeBenedictis, Excuse Me, Did You Get All That? Electronic v. Shorthand Reporting In The
Courtroom, 79 A.B.A. J. 84 (1993).
96 An Iowa state trial judge viewed videotape from the news media to determine if a
witness's hand gestures to the jury were objectionable. David Ranii, 'Instant Replay' for Mistrial
Motion, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11, 1983, at 2. Because of the judge's seat, he was not able to see the
witness's hand gestures when they were made and agreed to view a videotape shot by a television
station. The judge denied a motion for mistrial, but did instruct the jury to disregard the movements.
Campbell, supra note 90, at n.29.
97 See, e.g., id. See generally Adele Hedges & Robert Higgason, Videotaped Statements
of Facts on Appeal: Parent of the Thirteenth Juror?, 33 HOUS. LAW. 24 (1995) (written in part by a
Texas state court appellate judge).
98 Hedges & Higgason, supra note 97, at 24 ("Gaps in the tape and poor quality audio
and video results are the basis for many complaints, but these problems can be solved through the
use of better machines and technicians.") (footnote omitted); see also Pottinger v. Warden,
Northpoint Training Ctr., 716 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (complaining about quality of
audio and video in a video record).
99 Hedges & Higgason, supra note 97, at 24 & n.6; DeBenedictis, supra note 95, at 85
("The criminal appellate lawyers who represent Kentucky indigents have said it takes three to four
times longer to prepare briefs from videotape than from a court reporter's transcript."). But see id. at
86 (noting that after eight years of experience using video transcripts, lawyers take on average one
day longer to prepare briefs from video transcripts); see also Pottinger, 716 F. Supp. at 1008 ("The
task of reviewing the record is one a judge cannot delegate, but must waste time watching what he
could have read in one-tenth the time. This court spent nearly three hours watching the videotape
record of the jury selection and other parts of the trial."). The Pottinger court noted its desire for a
written transcript to be furnished along with the videorecord. Id.; see also Foster v. Kassulke, 898
F.2d 1144, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990) (criminal defendant argued that length of time required to review
videorecord made it nearly impossible for counsel to write effective briefs within time limits, and
thus, rendered counsel ineffective); Travieso v. Golden, 643 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994) ("While video may eventually provide useful supplements to a written record, efficient use of
appellate court time requires the submission of a written transcript of trial proceedings."); State v.
Quintero, 823 P.2d 981, 983 (Or. App. 1991) ("Although review of a video recording may be more
difficult and time consuming for the parties and reviewing courts on appeal, that, in itself, does not
provide a basis for reversal."); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Video Depositions, Transcripts and Trials, 43
EMORY L. J. 1071, 1087 (1994) (An appellate decisionmaker can watch a video at the rate of human
speech, about 100 words per minute, while it can read a written transcript about five times that fast.).
l00 See Hedges & Higgason, supra note 97, at 24 ("It is in the appellate court's
evidentiary review that technological advances pose a threat. The increased use of video
technology... promise[s] to alter our method of appellate review in profound ways that are
[Vol. 74:1
HeinOnline  -- 74 Brook. L. Rev. 110 2008-2009
FOCUS ON BATSON
Courts and commentators are concerned that permitting an appellate
court to view a witness's appearance and behavior over videotape "set[s]
the stage for appellate courts to sit as thirteenth jurors..... For example,
these criticisms 1 2 have been levied at the Supreme Court's recent
reliance on videotape in Scott v. Harris.°3 While no one has argued that
the Court should not have reviewed the video, Justice Stevens in his
dissent criticized the Court's decision in Scott. He argued that in
watching the tape and coming to its own conclusions about the events,
the Court improperly put itself in the role of the fact-finder."° Indeed, a
reviewing court has an even greater ability than a juror to assess a
witness's credibility because "[v]ideo technology allows the appellate
court to stop, freeze frame, rewind, and review endlessly-capabilities
denied to the jury."'0 5
However, when faced with the questions of whether and how an
appellate court should review video on appeal, most courts and
commentators do not focus on what type of information is contained in
the video; whether the video was presented at trial or is in fact a video of
the trial; or the legal question to be analyzed. That is, they do not
consider (1) whether they are reviewing a video of "evidence" or of
something else, or (2) whether a review of a video would enhance or
detract from the court's appellate function given the nature of the legal
question before the court. But, as will be discussed in more detail below,
whether the video contains testimonial or non-testimonial evidence and,
thus, whether it contains evidence that has an effective non-video
analogue, affects these determinations. For some types of issues,
reviewing video is no better than (and some might argue worse than)
reviewing a stenographic record or other traditional evidence. For other
issues, reviewing a videorecord is far superior to reviewing a traditional
disconsonant with established authority."). However, not all commentators view this development as
inherently negative. See, e.g., Owen & Mather, supra note 25, at 412 ("Video technology refutes the
rhetoric of necessity that has long been invoked to defend traditional standards of appellate court
deference to trial court decisionmaking. Appellate courts, if they so choose, now can have access via
video to the same 'data' that presumably inform the discretionary decisions of trial judges, and that
were heretofore impossible to examine on appeal. The advent of video technology makes de novo
appellate reviews of such trial court rulings a real possibility for the first time.").
101 Hedges & Higgason, supra note 97, at 25.
102 See generally, e.g., George M. Dery HI, The Needless "Slosh" Through the "Morass
of Reasonableness": The Supreme Court's Usurpation of Fact Finding Powers in Assessing
Reasonable Force in Scott v. Harris, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 417, 436-48 (2008)
(criticizing the majority's overreliance on the videotape as well as its interpretation and
characterization of events in the videotape); David Kessler, Note, Justices in the Jury Box: Video
Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 423 (2008) (criticizing the majority's overreliance on the videotape).
103 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
104 Id. at 1782 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority as "my colleagues on the
jury").
105 Hedges & Higgason, supra note 97, at 26. Yet another criticism involves the ability for
parties to "find" errors that might not be revealed by a written transcript. See id. at 26 (discussing
Deemer v. Finger, 817 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1990), in which the videotape of proceedings revealed
possible juror disqualification that was not seen by counsel during trial).
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record. As will be discussed in Part IV below, Batson demonstrates one
of those latter issues.
B. Types of Videos Used in Trial and Appellate Courts
Before the advent of videotape, evidence was testimonial,
documentary, or physical. The trier of fact gathered all of her
information about the events underlying the trial by listening to witnesses
describe the events, reviewing documents pertaining to the events, or
viewing still photographs relating to the events. But with video, rather
than hearing a description of what happened or seeing an isolated portion
of what happened in a still photograph", the trier of fact and the
reviewing court can actually see and hear underlying events as they
happened.
The next section will explore the value of three different types of
videos: (1) video of testimonial evidence (simply presenting video of
witness testimony in place of live witness testimony); (2) video of out-
of-court non-testimonial evidence (video of events or actions taking
place outside of the courtroom); and (3) video of in-court non-testimonial
evidence (video of events or actions taking placing inside the
courtroom). As will be discussed below, depending on the nature of the
action in the video and the nature of the legal question, sometimes using
video will assist both the trier of fact and the appellate court coming to
its decisions; other times, however, it will not. The distinction will turn
on (1) what is contained in video, and (2) what type of legal question
is at issue.
1. Video of Testimonial Evidence
The use of videotaped witness testimony at the trial court level is
now commonly accepted. For instance, courts frequently admit witness
testimony via a videotaped deposition. Since 1993, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have allowed any party to record a deposition by video
without prior permission from the court."7 Moreover, if any party so
desires, it may present the deposition in its video form during a jury trial
(so long as it is not being offered solely for impeachment purposes),
unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.'o
Absent a videotaped deposition, a jury would typically hear the
testimony of an absent witness from an attorney who would read that
106 One might argue that certain still photos are superior to video in that they capture a
moment frozen in time to be examined with a level of scrutiny that is not possible while watching a
moving image; nonetheless, use of the freeze frame and slow motion functions of video playback
can have the same result.
107 See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2).
108 FED. R. Civ. P. 32(c). However, if a party does so, it must also provide a stenographic
transcript of the video offered. Id.; see also Perritt, supra note 99, at 1072 & n. 12.
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witness's transcript aloud." Most courts recognize that "videotape
depositions are a superior means of presenting an absent witness's
testimony because they allow the trier-of-fact to better judge the
credibility of the witness. . . ."" As one trial court explained:
While we often make decisions by written word alone, when it comes to
determining facts by comparing the testimonies of one or more persons, we do
a better job by being able to employ as many of our senses as possible.
Personally observing the witness is preferable. Next in rank would be viewing a
video deposition where one directly uses the combined senses of hearing and
seeing without the filtering process that occurs when one listens to a deposition
being read or reads it himself from the cold record which excludes pitch and
intonation of voice, rapidity of speech, and all the other aural and visual
clues.l '
Not only do videotape presentations of testimonial evidence
assist the trier of fact in making credibility determinations, they also
assist the trial judge in making certain evidentiary decisions when those
decisions turn on the witness's demeanor. For instance, in a criminal
case, the government videotaped testimony from a witness who was
unavailable to testify at trial because he was hospitalized."' When the
tape was offered into evidence, the defense objected that the prosecutor
had been leading the witness, and the prosecutor asked the court to deem
the witness a hostile witness." 3 The court agreed, and in affirming that
decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that the videotape made it possible for
the trial court to gauge the witness's demeanor more accurately than it
could have with "just a cold deposition record.""..4
However, while video of testimonial evidence is widely
recognized as an effective tool at the trial level, appellate courts have
been wary about reviewing testimony on video, whether deposition
testimony or a videorecord of trial testimony, based on concerns about
intruding on the role of the trier of fact."5 While many courts will, in
9 see FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(1); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES, 159-60
(6th ed. 2002).110 Meredith v. Schreiner Transp., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D. Kan. 1993),
abrogated on other grounds by Wirtz v. Kan. Farm Bureau Serv., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D.
Kan. 2005).
II Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Se. Toyota Distribs., Inc., 114 F.R.D. 647, 649
(M.D.N.C. 1987). This case was decided on plaintiffs motion to videotape all the depositions in a
largecommercial case prior to the amendment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit
video depositions without a court order. Id.; see also Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling Co., 764
F.2d 252, 259 n.6 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing the legion of cases that have extolled the advantages of
video depositions and preference for their use in a trial, noting that a witness's demeanor reflected in
his motions, expressions, voice inflections, give the fact-finder a unique advantage in evaluating
evidence).
112 United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1982).
113 Id. at 1187-88.
114 Id. at 1188 ("The trial judge was able to note [the witness's] attitude reflected by his
motions, facial expressions, demeanor, and voice inflections.").
15 See, e.g., Briana E. Chua, Comment, Arizona's Digital Record and Its Use on Appeal,
35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605, 611-13 (providing technical criticisms of the time involved in searching video
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fact, review video of testimonial evidence, some refuse to do so. For
example, in Moustakas v. Dashavesky, in declining to review a videotape
on appeal even when no written transcript existed, the California Court
of Appeals explained its reservations:
The rules of court do not address the most important implication of the
videotaping of trial proceedings. Many aspects of the time-honored rules
limiting the scope of appellate review are based on the trial judge's opportunity
to see and hear witnesses, attorneys, and jurors. A drastic change in the
principles of appellate review would be needed before we could base our
decisions on appeal on our own evaluation of the sights and sounds of the trial
courtroom. Because of the far-reaching implications, any such change must
come from the Legislature or from higher judicial authority. Accordingly, we
do not regard the videotape as part of the record on this appeal.,
16
However, even though it refused to review the videotape, the court noted
that "the visible and audible information thus recorded might be of value
to many people, including judges.' ' 7
Other courts will review video of witness testimony, but in doing
so, retain the traditional deference to the fact-finder's credibility
determinations. For example, in Mitchell v. Archibald, in denying the
appellant's request to re-weigh the evidence and make an independent
determination of the witness's credibility, the appellate court noted that its
decision not to expand the appellate court's existing role in weighing and
determining witness credibility does not mean that videotape records cannot be
used either to point out other errors in the trial proceedings or to provide
concrete, clear, and convincing evidence that a trial court's conclusions
regarding a witness's credibility were erroneous.
118
Two important points arise from the courts' decisions and
comments in Moustakas and Mitchell. First, an appellate court's review
of testimonial evidence on video presents some dangers: appellate judges
might, consciously or unconsciously, be tempted to second-guess the
trier of fact's credibility determination. And, in this case, an appellate
court's refusal to review video of testimonial evidence (whether that
video contains deposition or trial testimony) does no harm to the
litigants. The appellate court can effectively review legal questions raised
(even if that question is a sufficiency of the evidence question) when the
resolution of that question relies on testimonial evidence because the
court has an effective non-video analogue: the stenographic transcript.
Given that the determination of witness credibility is one of the
quintessential functions granted to the trier of fact, the concerns raised
transcripts and substantive criticisms of the fact that "cases involving video records were more likely
to be affirmed than those with traditional transcripts").
116 Moustakas v. Dashavesky, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 753, 754-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
117 Id. at 753-54; see also Conservatorship of McElroy, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 485, 491 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Moustakas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754-55, which declined defendant's request
to reweigh factual determinations based on videotaped evidence).
118 Mitchell v. Archibald, 971 S.w.2d 25, 30 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).
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about the blurring of the traditional lines between the role of the fact-
finder and reviewing courts are greatest when an appellate court is asked
to review video of testimonial evidence. Because the appellate court is
not permitted to assess witness credibility, the videotape provides the
appellate court with nothing more to consider than does the stenographic
transcript. That is, the standard of review prohibits the appellate court
from considering anything beyond the witness's words, and those words
are adequately captured in the written transcript.
Second, these courts recognize that there is a difference between
appellate review of testimonial evidence and its review of "visible and
audible information"1"9 on a videotape to assess "other errors in the trial
proceedings."'2 ° This distinction, as will be discussed in more detail
below, is critical in determining whether a court should review a
videotape. Because a videotape that contains other "visible and audible
information" that relate to "other errors in the trial proceedings" provides
information that is not as likely to have been captured in a stenographic
transcript, it will be more valuable to an appellate court. Moreover, these
"other errors in the trial proceedings" will generally not be matters for
the jury to assess, and, thus, the concern that a court will intrude upon the
province of the fact-finder by reviewing video in these situations is
reduced. As will be discussed in Part IV below, review of Batson
decisions fits both of these criteria.
2. Video of Out-of-Court Non-Testimonial Evidence
When a video does not contain testimonial evidence, but instead
contains other "visible and audible information," then review of the
video, either by a finder of fact or by a reviewing court, is more helpful
than its non-video analogue: witness testimony at the trial level or a
stenographic transcript at the appellate level. Video of non-testimonial
evidence lets the viewer see and hear information firsthand rather than
having that information filtered through a witness. Further, regardless of
the standard of review for the legal issue under consideration, the
concerns about the distinction between the functions of the trial court and
the appellate court are reduced as review of these tapes does not require
(or permit) an assessment of credibility. Instead, an appellate court would
assess the evidence to determine if it meets the applicable legal standard
(i.e., clear error, sufficiency of the evidence, etc.) not to determine
whether a particular witness is worthy of belief. Even though viewers of
the same tape can come to different conclusions, 2' these differences do
not turn on an assessment of credibility. Moreover, the nature of the legal
119 Moustakas, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754.
120 Mitchell, 971 S.W.2d at 30 n.7.
121 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1781, 1785 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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issue will provide the court guidance on how to resolve these differences
in interpretation. 2
The kinds of information regarding out-of-court events that are
presented via video run the gamut, from videos that are made
purposefully to capture information that is likely to be reviewed in court
("staged" video)123  to those that capture events spontaneously
("contemporaneous" video)124 to those that are created solely for
evidentiary purposes ("retroactive" video).2 5 For purposes of this
discussion, this Article will focus on "staged" video as it closely parallels
a videorecord. That is, videos that are "staged" are intentionally taken
contemporaneously for the purpose of being reviewed later if necessary.
Courts often use staged videos or videos of underlying events
that are taken to preserve a record for future court proceedings. One of
the most common out-of-court activities captured on video is the police
interrogation. These videos have been used as evidence both at trial and
in pre-trial suppression hearings. For example, in People v. Al-Yousif,'26
the Colorado Supreme Court relied on a videotaped confession to
determine that the defendant understood that he waived his Miranda
rights and thus, reversed the trial court's finding that his confession was
not made voluntarily."7 The court noted that it must review different
"types" of facts differently: it reviews "historical facts"'28 for clear error,
but it reviews the ultimate question of voluntariness, a constitutional fact,
de novo. 29
In Al-Yousif, the court reviewed the historical fact of whether the
defendant spoke English. Although the court agreed with most of the trial
court's factual findings on this point, it disagreed with the specific
finding that the defendant misunderstood the word "statement," based in
part upon viewing the defendant's demeanor and in part upon his
122 For example, on a sufficiency of the evidence issue, the court will be required to
resolve such disputes in favor of the appellee. See, e.g., Oldfather, infra note 128, at 328.
123 Gruber, supra note 93, § 2, at 192.
124 "Contemporaneous video evidence" is defined as "contemporaneously recorded
videotape evidence of actual facts or original events in controversy, that is, ... 'live' videotape
recordings of the actual events or incidents in controversy or giving rise to the litigation." Id. § 1, at
189. Courts frequently admit videos of underlying events that are taken by happenstance. That is,
friends or family, or maybe a bystander with a video camera, happen to record events that later
become evidence in a lawsuit. These videos may be, and often are, admitted into evidence to be
considered by the trier-of-fact, subject to the rules of evidence. Id. § 38, at 255.
125 One of the most common type of "retrospective" videos admitted into evidence is the
"day-in-the-life" video offered in many tort cases to show the effects of allegedly tortious actions on
the plaintiff. Id. § 2, at 191-92.
126 49 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
127 Id. at 1167.
128 "Historical facts" are those facts regarding what happened to form the basis of the
lawsuit. Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction,
57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 439 (2004) (defining "historical fact" as the "who, when, what, and where"
series of questions); see also Bryan Adamson, All Facts Are Not Created Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 629, 632 n.20 (2004). By definition then, these facts occur outside the courtroom.
129 Al-Yousif, 49 P.3d at 1169.
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words. 3 ' When making its decision on the voluntariness of the
defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights after reviewing the videotape of
his confession, the trial court relied on evidence that would not be as
readily discernible from testimony about, a written transcript of, or even
an audiotape of the interrogation. For example, the trial judge considered
"the rapid reading of the rights (eighteen seconds) and the fact that the
position of the form did not allow Al-Yousif to read along."'' The
appellate court, based on its own independent review of the videotape,
came to the opposite conclusion, but also relied on evidence that would
not be available from the "cold record": "[t]he video revealed that when
the detectives spoke in lengthy sentences, the defendant was more apt to
become confused, especially when those sentences were spoken
rapidly.' 32
The Colorado Supreme Court noted "that the video's existence
enable[d] [it] to undertake this review not just from the 'cold record,'
but-at least in part-in precisely the same manner as the trial court."'
13
The dissent, however, raised concerns that precisely because the court
could conduct the same review of the video as the trial court, the
majority placed undue emphasis on the video, to the exclusion of other
evidence offered at the suppression hearing.33 Thus, the dissent
concluded, the majority failed to afford appropriate deference to the trial
court's findings of historical fact. 135
More recently, in Scott v. Harris,'36 the case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on video for the first time, the district court denied
a police officer's motion for summary judgment on an excessive force
claim.'37 While the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court
reversed, placing substantial reliance on a videotape made during a
police chase. 31 In setting out the standard by which to review the
decision on a motion for summary judgment, the Court noted the
following: "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for
purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."' 39
130 Id. at 1170 ("When asked whether his 'statement was voluntarily given,' AI-Yousif
looked confused and said, 'What statement?' (not, 'What is a statement?'). The tape demonstrates he
knew the word 'statement,' but thought the detectives were talking about a statement he had already
made.") (emphasis added).
131 Id.
U2 Id. at 1171.
133 Id.
134 See id. at 1177 (Bender, J., dissenting).
135 See id.
136 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
137 Id. at 1773.
138 The Court noted that there were no allegations that the tape was altered in any way or
that "what it depicts differs from what actually happened." Id. at 1775.
139 Id. at 1776. Interestingly, the Court sets out the facts using a first person narrative:
"[W]e see respondent's vehicle .... We see it swerve .... We see it run multiple red lights .... Far
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And, in response to the dissent's criticism of the majority's
reaction to the tape, Justice Scalia invited the reader to view the tape and
"allow the videotape to speak for itself.""'' Indeed, the Court chastised
the Eleventh Circuit for relying on the plaintiffs version of the events
rather than viewing "the facts in the light depicted by the videotape."'
' 41
What is striking about Scott is that none of the justices
questioned whether the Court should view the videotape and, if so, how
much weight they should give to it. Reliance on the tape seemed to be
taken for granted. Instead, the dispute between the majority and the
dissent was over the analysis, driving home the obvious, but unstated,
problem that even contemporaneous video evidence is subject to
interpretation. 142
In both of these cases, while the courts were divided as to how
much weight to give the video and how to interpret the video, both courts
recognized that the videos contained important information that would
not be discernible from a written transcript. Thus, because the non-video
from being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court depicts, what we see on the video more
closely resembles a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort .. " Id. at 1775-76
(emphasis added). Not only does the Court tell the story that it saw, but it does so in vivid language
that places the reader, along with the Court, in the driver's seat: the respondent's vehicle is "racing
down narrow, two-lane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast." The car
"swerve[s] around more than a dozen other cars, cross[es] the double-yellow line, and force[s] cars
traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid being hit." Id. at 1775.
140 Id. at 1775 n.5 (providing hyperlink to the videotape); see also id. at 1780 (Breyer, J.
concurring) ("Because watching the video footage of the car chase made a difference to my own
view of the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage of the link in the Court's
opinion, and watch it.") (internal citation omitted).
141 Id. at 1776. A similar outcome resulted from the court's analysis in Tennessee v.
Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tenn. 2000). In that case, in reviewing a trial court's determination
that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle, the Tennessee Supreme
Court reviewed a videotape that the officer made while following the defendant before pulling him
over. On the audio portion of the tape, the officer "commented that [the defendant] had 'already
crossed the yellow line twice,' observed that 'the vehicle just made a hard swerve,' and noted that
[the defendant] ... was 'running about 60 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone."' Id. at 216
(quoting police officer). Reviewing the court's finding of fact de novo, the court held that the
officer's statements made at the time of the investigation were "clearly contradicted by the visual
portion of the tape, and thus, [the court gave] them little weight in [its] de novo review of the
evidence." Id. at 219. The court continued: "Contrary to what Officer Davis stated that he observed,
we find that [the defendant] did not violate any rules of the road during the period in which the video
camera recorded his driving." Id.
142 The issue of interpretation was discussed more fully in Binette. There, the court
employed the de novo standard to review findings of fact because the trial court's decision was based
solely on the videotaped evidence. Thus, the appellate court was in the same position to view the
tape as the trial court was and there were no credibility decisions to be made. Binette, 33 S.W.3d at
217. However, the court reserved judgment on the issue of the proper standard of appellate review of
a videotaped trial as that issue was not presented to the court. Id. at 217 n.1. The dissent, however,
argued that, in fact, a credibility determination is necessarily made in every decision of a court. Id. at
220-21 (Holder, J., dissenting). In support of its argument, the dissent noted that the trial court, the
intermediate court of appeals, and the Tennessee Supreme Court all interpreted the events on the
tape differently. Thus, "[b]y falling to give any presumption of correctness to the trial court, the
majority essentially endorses a 'last in line is right' rule." Id. at 221. The dissent concluded that trial
judges are better finders of fact, regardless of the form of the evidence, than are appellate judges. Id.
at 220-21; see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1081227 (last visited Sept. 17, 2008).
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analogues for non-testimonial evidence are not as valuable to the trier of
fact or to the appellate court as video can be and because there is a
reduced danger of encroaching on the role of the fact-finder, when non-
testimonial video evidence is involved, there should be a preference for
review of the video by the trial court and by the appellate court.
3. Video of In-Court Non-Testimonial "Evidence"
For each of the types of video just discussed, a non-video
analogue (in fact, a non-video predecessor) exists. In general, that
analogue would be witness testimony describing the underlying events
perhaps accompanied by still photographs. But, as will be discussed
below, when a trial court must decide, and an appellate court is faced
with review of, questions of what happened in the courtroom'43 (as
opposed to what was said in the courtroom), the videorecord of the
proceedings will more often than not be the only "evidence" available for
consideration. Without a videorecord of the in-court activity, the trial
judge is left to make decisions based on her own memory, observations,
and perceptions, and the appellate court is left only with the trial judge's
report of these memories, observations, and perceptions. However, these
memories, observations, and perceptions are not "evidence" in the legal
sense of the term.1" And, a decision based on personal observation and
perception is not necessarily reliable.'45 Therefore, in these cases, the
videorecord of in-court events, in fact, is the only "evidence" available.
For example, one case vividly demonstrates that "being there"
does not always mean having a better view. During a pre-trial hearing on
a suppression motion, a witness for the State attacked the defendant.'"
Thereafter, the trial judge closed the proceedings to the defendant's
family based on her perception of the family's response to the attack.
Although the events directly before and after the fracas were recorded by
the court reporter, the fight itself was not, though the reporter transcribed
the trial judge's recitation of the events about two hours after the fight.'47
Even though the reviewing court could review the judge's statement,
143 Other types of issues that might typically fall within this category are attorney and
judicial misconduct. See, e.g., Kristina G. Van Arsdel, Burdine v. Johnson: The Fifth Circuit Wakes
Up, but the Supreme Court Refuses to Put the Sleeping Attorney Standard to Rest, 39 HOUS. L. REV.
835, 868 (2002) (arguing for the use of videotape in the courtroom to evaluate claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel when counsel falls asleep during trial).
144 Among several definitions of evidence, Black's Law Dictionary includes the
following: "The collective mass of things, esp. testimony and exhibits, presented before a tribunal in
a given dispute." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (8th ed. 2004). That is, evidence is something that
is intentionally brought before the court and submitted in accordance with the rules of evidence.
Neither thejudge nor the jury may rely on matters outside the record as "evidence."
14s See generally ELIZABETH F. LOFrUS ET AL., EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL (4th ed. 2007) (detailing the mistakes that occur in eyewitness testimony).
146 Walker v. State, 723 A.2d 922 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
147 The written transcript merely stated that "[a]n altercation erupted in the courtroom
between the witness and the defendant." Id. at 928.
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because the events had been recorded on video, the court included the
tape as part of the record as well.'48 The appellate court noted that "[iln a
sense, the judge relied on her own credibility and reliability as a witness
in determining to issue a closure order," and concluded that "this case
pits the videotape of the courtroom disturbance against the transcript,
which contains the trial judge's observations." '149
Reviewing the judge's finding of fact for clear error, the
appellate court determined that the judge's account of the events was not,
in fact, supported by substantial evidence based on the events in the
videotape.5 ° Recognizing that a video transcript is not without
limitations, the court noted several advantages of the use of video in this
situation. First, "the video cameras that were used in the courtroom, were
not 'static,"' that is, they were not fixed on a particular point in the room;
thus, "the video cameras [could] capture[] the details of the incident in a
way that an ordinary eyewitness understandably could not."'' Second,
"unlike an actual eyewitness caught in the frenzy of the moment, [the
appellate court was] able to scrutinize, analyze, and repeatedly review
the videotape, and [did] so in the calm, dispassionate milieu afforded to
an appellate court."'52 Third, the review also "benefitted from
technological aids, such as slow motion and the use of freeze frames."'53
148 Id. at 924.
149 Id. at 925.
150 The trial judge recalled the incident as follows:
For this record, [appellant's family] left their seats. They approached this rail. They were
all yelling. I told them to leave the courtroom and they made eye contact with me and
refused to do that, while the deputies were trying to put this affray down and I'm not
going to let them in here.
Id. at 929. After viewing the tape, however, the appellate court determined "it [did] not appear [that]
either the family or appellant 'decided to get into the affray."' Id. at 931 (quoting trial court). The
court observed that, although the family members were upset and moving around the courtroom,
none of them passed the rail separating the public seating area of the courtroom from the well of the
court. Id. In holding that the trial judge's findings were not supported by the evidence, the court
stated as follows:
Considering that the episode lasted less than a minute, we are not clear as to the basis for
the judge's determination that the family "refused" to comply with her directive to leave
the courtroom. To be sure, the family members never verbally indicated that they were
unwilling to exit the courtroom. Although the trial judge repeatedly said "get out" during
the disturbance, and she claimed to have made "eye contact" with the family, we perceive
no factual basis to determine that the family members immediately heard the judge over
their own screams, or that they immediately realized, in the midst of such chaos, that the
judge was actually speaking to them. Moreover, as we said, the family vacated the
courtroom in less than a minute.
Id.
151 Id. at 926.
152 Id.
153 Id.; see also Suggs v. State, 589 A.2d 551, 554 & n.2 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (on
claim that judge's tirade against defense counsel denied him a fair trial, appellate court reviewed
video of proceedings to determine that jury was still in the courtroom when the court commanded
the sheriff to take hold of defense counsel).
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While this example is certainly an extreme and atypical
courtroom occurrence, it vividly illustrates that (1) relying on one's own
memory and perception of events is not always the best "evidence," and
(2) no non-video analogue exists to allow review of events that happen-as
opposed to words that are uttered-in the courtroom.
Thus, when appellate courts review trial court decisions that are
based as much on what happened in the courtroom as on what was said
in the courtroom, reviewing a videotape, if one is available, is superior to
relying on the written record. As will be discussed in the next section,
voir dire, a common courtroom occurrence, is made up of both words
that are uttered and events that happen. Therefore, when reviewing
decisions relating to what happened during voir dire, including decisions
on Batson challenges, courts should review videotapes of the voir dire
proceedings, if they are available.
IV. USING VIDEORECORDS TO EVALUATE BATSON OBJECTIONS
As discussed above, the Batson scheme to evaluate
discrimination in jury selection has been repeatedly criticized as
unworkable, in large part because so many of the neutral reasons given at
the second step of the analysis are based on non-verbal factors, which are
not captured in a stenographic transcript. While some have proposed that
Batson be abandoned and others have argued that the peremptory
challenge no longer serves a valid purpose, recent cases demonstrate that
the Supreme Court is not inclined to alter the basic Batson scheme.
Consequently, to secure the protections advanced by Batson, the courts
must look beyond the way that they are currently implementing Batson
to find strategies to make Batson work. One way is for courts to rely
more heavily on videorecords when assessing the validity of challenged
strikes.
One of the reasons that the Batson scheme is unworkable is that
the burden-shifting analysis was imported from the employment
discrimination arena." And while Batson certainly seeks to protect
jurors and litigants from discrimination in jury selection, the differences
between using such a scheme to determine the ultimate issue in a case
and using it to attempt to ferret out discrimination during the trial are
great enough to make the scheme unworkable in the latter situation.
In employment discrimination (and other discrimination) cases,
the burden-shifting scheme is used at the summary judgment stage to
determine whether the plaintiff has sufficient evidence to bring her case
before the jury. 5' In such a situation, unlike in the Batson situation, the
154 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 n.18 (1986) ("Our decisions concerning
'disparate treatment' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have explained the operation of
prima facie burden of proof rules.").
155 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
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court (first the judge at the first two steps of the scheme and then the jury
at the last step) must resolve a question about something that has
happened outside of the courtroom. For example, the court must
determine whether the plaintiff has been denied promotion or has been
terminated for a discriminatory reason.
In making that decision, the judge and jury consider the admitted
evidence, in the form of documents, declarations, and deposition
testimony at the first two steps, and witness testimony and documentary
evidence at the third step. However, when a trial judge is asked to use the
same framework to ferret out discrimination in jury selection, she does
not have the same types of evidence available to her nor is she acting in
the same role as she (or the jury) would in using the burden-shifting
scheme to resolve questions of discrimination in the employment
context. Indeed, without a videorecord, to assess the validity of a neutral
reason based on nonverbal communication or behavior, the court has no
evidence at all: the only thing she has to rely on in making her decisions
are her own observations and the arguments of counsel.
Thus, to ensure that the constitutional rights of both jurors and
litigants are protected when prosecutors proffer neutral reasons based on
intangible factors such as demeanor, body language, and tone of voice,
which cannot be evaluated from a written transcript, both trial and
appellate courts should avail themselves of videotapes when assessing
the validity of the neutral reason and when reviewing that determination
on appeal.
A. Resolution of the Batson Challenge at the Trial Level
While much has been written about appellate court review of
videorecords, little consideration has been afforded to the utility of
review of videorecords by the trial judge during the course of the
proceedings. In the Batson context, however, the review of a videorecord
by the trial judge is critical: by using a videorecord, the trial judge's role
in assessing Batson objections will be closer to a finder of fact's role in
assessing a claim of employment discrimination.
First, although the judge is charged with assessing the validity of
the prosecutor's neutral reason based on the "evidence" before her, in
fact, there is no "evidence" in the legal sense of the term. Instead, the
judge must make her factual determination based on (1) her own
observations and memory, and (2) the memory and observations of
counsel, who are now required to act in the dual role of witness and
advocate. When a fact-finder, either the jury or the court, finds a
historical fact (that is, a fact regarding what happened to form the basis
of the lawsuit'56), it does so based on evidence presented to it in the form
156 In contrast to historical facts, "constitutional facts" are those facts that are
"fundamental to the existence of a constitutional right." Adamson, supra note 128, at 633 & n.28
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of witness testimony, documentary evidence, or physical evidence.
(While the determination of the validity of a neutral reason is generally
considered a finding of historical fact, this finding differs from the
typical finding of historical fact. Thus, the use of the term "historical
fact" is misleading. A more appropriate moniker is "courtroom fact.")
When a fact-finder makes a finding of historical fact, it does not rely on
its own perception or memory of the underlying events, nor does it rely
on counsel's perception or memory of the underlying events. 57 However,
in the Batson context, the trial judge is asked to take on multiple roles:
she is participant, witness, and trier of fact. She participates in, and in
fact controls, the jury selection; at the same time, she observes the jurors
and counsel as a witness; but then, when a Batson objection is raised, she
is transformed into the trier of fact.
One might argue that a finding of fact based on one's own
perceptions of an event is more credible than a finding of a true historical
fact, based on the fact-finder's assessment of the evidence presented, but
that is not necessarily so. There are disadvantages to "being there."
"Trials are largely oral and visual productions.""1 8 Just as jurors are
expected to retain information that is presented only for an instant,
without time or opportunity for reflection on that information or how it
relates to other information in the trial, trial judges must do the same
during voir dire.'59 And, just as juries may be permitted to review video
evidence, particularly when that evidence is non-testimonial evidence,1"
then so too should trial judges review video of non-verbal
communication during jury selection when making the decision on a
Batson objection.
Although discussing the value of a stenographic record, not a
videorecord, one commentator draws an analogy that is even more apt
when discussing review of a videorecord:
(quoting Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between The Trial
And Appellate Levels: A Unified View Of The Scope Of Review, The Judge/Jury Question, And
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993, 995 n.13 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
That the finding of purposeful discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause is not a
constitutional fact (or even an ultimate fact) subject to a more searching standard of review has been
discussed, see id. at 635-36 & nn.45-48, and whether that type of finding is mischaracterized is
beyond the scope of this Article.
157 Indeed, typically witnesses to the underlying events can be challenged for cause if they
are called for jury duty in a trial related to those events. See generally 50A C.J.S. Juries § 374
(1997) ("Ordinarily, at common law a juror is not incompetent merely because the juror is a witness
in the case, but it has generally been held that either party may challenge such juror for cause. Some
statutes provide that a witness shall not be competent as a juror if challenged for that reason.").
158 Oldfather, supra note 128, at 451.
159 "[T]he trial judge's experience of the trial, like the jury's, consists primarily of oral
testimony. This reality suggests that trial judges' evaluation of the evidence is subject to the same
limitations as the jury's evaluation, and thus amenable to the same correctives." Id. at 454 n.67.
160 See 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial §§ 1431-33 (trial court generally has discretion to permit
jurors to take video evidence into the jury room, but some courts do not allow jurors to review
videotaped depositions).
2008]
HeinOnline  -- 74 Brook. L. Rev. 123 2008-2009
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
A second viewing of a play or movie, for example, will reveal details and
nuances missed in the first viewing. The viewer has to expend less effort
simply following the story and can thus allocate more attention to the details.
Moreover, the repeat viewer knows where the story will lead, and as a result
knows which details are worthy of that attention.
16
'
As discussed above, when required to provide neutral reasons for
exercising strikes, prosecutors routinely respond with non-verbal
reasons, which, by their very nature, cannot be captured in a stenographic
transcript. Thus, if the trial judge cannot remember which jurors were or
were not paying attention, closing their eyes, or making faces during the
voir dire, she has no choice but to rely on counsel to provide that
information. Although most courts do not require the proponent of the
strike to testify under oath as to the neutral reasons, 61 the fact that the
attorney does not become a witness in the legal sense of the term does
not mean that the attorney is not essentially acting as a witness by telling
the court what she did and did not see or hear during the voir dire
proceedings. However, at the same time she is advocating for a position,
and, in fact, the attorney who opposes the Batson objection is advocating
on her own behalf. Moreover, the "evidence" is presented as argument,
not in an orderly, question and answer fashion, with an opportunity for
cross-examination. Combining the roles of witness and advocate has
been recognized as inherently dangerous.'63 Thus, the availability of
video allows the trial court to have an "instant replay," which would give
the court the evidence that it needs to make its finding of fact without
forcing the court to rely on its own observations, memories, and
perceptions, and without putting counsel in the dual role of witness and
advocate.
Second, the trial judge is not given the proper tools to adequately
make a finding of fact of purposeful discrimination in jury selection. A
jury (or the judge in a bench trial) has the benefit of an opening statement
and often preliminary instructions from the court that highlight the
evidence that the parties expect to elicit during trial as well as the issue
that the jury will be asked to decide at the close of evidence. Thus, the
jury can view the evidence through the lens of the legal issue that it will
ultimately be asked to decide. By contrast, while a trial judge is certainly
aware that a Batson issue may arise in any voir dire proceeding, she has
no idea which jurors the parties may strike or the neutral reasons that
might be given for striking those jurors.
161 Oldfather, supra note 128, at 455-56. Oldfather notes that the analogy is not perfect
because the opening statement allows counsel to tell the jurors where the story will lead. Id. at 456.
he also notes that the trial judge does not have the advantage of reviewing details. Id. at 454-55.
162 See, e.g., People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 459-60 (I11. 1989).
163 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 3.7 cmt. 2 ("A witness is required to
testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on
evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be
taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.").
[Vol. 74:1
HeinOnline  -- 74 Brook. L. Rev. 124 2008-2009
FOCUS ON BATSON
In fact, a trial judge is at an even greater disadvantage in
assessing a Batson challenge than a jury is in finding a historical fact.
Given the nature of the Batson objection, the trial judge and defense
counsel usually will not have any reason to focus their attention on the
behavior or responses of any particular juror or jurors until the voir dire
has concluded, the prosecutor has made his strikes, the defendant has
challenged them, and the prosecutor has provided the requisite neutral
explanations. Thus, the "evidence" is not put in context until the strikes
are made and the reasons are given. In essence, the parties' arguments on
the validity of prosecutor's strikes serve as retrospective opening
statements.
Third, while the trier of fact focuses on the questioning of one
witness at a time to assess the credibility of that witness, the trial judge is
also expected to watch the entire venire and the attorneys for potential
Batson violations. The trial judge cannot realistically be expected to
recall the demeanor, behavior, and body language of each panel member
over the course of the voir dire.64
Finally, because Batson objections are generally not raised until
the end of a voir dire proceeding, once the parties have had an
opportunity to assess both the individual strikes and a pattern of strikes,
the judge is forced to recall a voir dire proceeding that may last from
several hours to many days. In this way, the Batson objection is unlike
other complaints a litigant might have about issues that arise during trial,
such as evidentiary issues or even prosecutorial misconduct, which
generally require a contemporaneous objection.'65
B. Appellate Review of the Batson Decision
As noted above, when reviewing decisions on Batson challenges,
appellate courts must give great deference to trial courts' factual
determinations. As the Supreme Court recognized, appellate review of a
164 While voir dire in a simple matter might be completed in a matter of hours or a few
days, in a complicated or high-profile case, jury selection can last weeks, even months, and
hundreds, even thousands, of potential jurors may be questioned and excused. See, e.g., National
Briefing West: California: Bid To Move Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A26 (jury selection in
murder prosecution against Scott Peterson lasted nearly two months); Robert Hanley, Jury Selection
In Trial Of Rabbi, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, at B6 (jury selection in murder prosecution of rabbi
accused of killing his wife expected to last six weeks); Joseph P. Fried, Capital Case Has Jury of 12
After Queries On Attitudes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998, at B4 (jury selection in first case to be tried
under New York State's new capital punishment statute lasted seven weeks and involved 350
potential jurors); Jury Selection Begins in Polly Klaus Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1995, at 15 (8500
prospective jurors summoned in Polly Klaas murder trial and voir dire expected to last four months).
165 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103(a) (requiring contemporaneous objection to preserve
evidentiary issue for appeal); United States v. Taylor, 514 F.3d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Where
the defendant contemporaneously moves for a mistrial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, we
review the denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion. By contrast, in cases of prosecutorial
misconduct in which the defendant makes no objection, our precedent limits us to plain error
review.") (citations omitted).
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Batson decision would "seldom" be based on "much evidence."'66 In
addition, the clear error standard 67 is generally justified based on
"reasoning thought to flow from the reality that appellate judges are not
present in the courtroom to witness testimony and evidence firsthand."'68
However, this standard has been described as a "legal fiction."' 69 Another
commentator has argued that it has "no intrinsic meaning" and is "elastic,
capacious, malleable, and above all variable."'17' But, as discussed above,
a videorecord of the voir dire can provide the elusive evidence. Thus, to
give teeth to the clear error standard, appellate courts should review
videorecords of voir dire when the prosecutor's neutral reasons depend
on a juror's non-verbal conduct or appearance.
To date, only a few reported cases involve appellate review of
Batson decisions involving videorecords, but those cases have at least
seen the potential benefits in doing so. In one case involving a Batson
issue, the appellate court reviewed the videotape of the voir dire at the
defendant's urging.' The tape did not prove particularly illuminating, as
the view of the juror in question was somewhat poor.172 Nonetheless, the
court noted that viewing the tape did, in fact, "illustrate the necessarily
subjective aspects of jury selection."' 73 The court was able to discern that
the juror's "hesitation in answering the questions appeared to be his
general characteristic rather than a sign he could not be fair juror," and
that it could not, in fact, detect a "smirk" on the juror's face. 174
166 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991).
167 A trial judge has committed clear error when the appellate court after reviewing all of
the '"evidence [would be] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha[d] been
committed."' Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948))
(alteration in original). Interestingly, even though a clear error standard applies to a Batson factual
finding, that standard of review is not, in fact, dictated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
That rule requires that "[flindings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . .[and due regard shall be given] to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). However, Batson decisions
are not based on oral or documentary evidence. Moreover, the rule applies only to cases "tried upon
the facts without a jury," which, by definition, cases involving Batson issues are not. Hernandez, 500
U.S. at 395.
168 Oldfather, supra, note 128, at 439. Although other considerations, such as "judicial
economy, the enhancement of public regard for the functioning of the judicial system, and the need
for both consistent decisions and clear rules," contribute to the justification for appellate deference to
trial-level fact finding, the notion of institutional competence is paramount. Id. at 445.
169 Adamson, supra note 128, at 631. That the finding of purposeful discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause is not a constitutional fact (or even an ultimate fact) subject
to a more searching standard of review has been discussed, see id. at 635-36 & nn.45-48, and
whether that type of finding is mischaracterized is beyond the scope of this Article.
170 Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of
Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 645, 645 (1988)).
171 State v. Polnett, No. 43399-7-I, 1999 WL 1054697 (Wash. App. Nov. 22, 1999).
172 Id. at *4.
173 Id.
174 Id. However, the court noted that even with a videotape to review, a trial judge would
be in a better position to view the subtle changes in a juror's expression. Id. Moreover, the court
rejected the defendant's "suggestion that [the] existence of a videotape alters the standard of review
or permits [the court] to give less deference to the [trial] court's findings." Id. at *4 n. 17.
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Review of a Batson decision is analogous to review of a claim of
prejudicial nonverbal communication by a trial judge. In that situation, as
in the Batson context, the appellate court is put in the difficult position of
having to review what at least one party claims to have happened in the
courtroom (as opposed to what was said in the courtroom).'75 Without an
"adequate" description of the behavior on the record, the appellate court
is left with nothing to review.'76 There too, commentators have suggested
that videorecords would cure the lack of reviewable "evidence" of non-
verbal communication by judges.'77 And while, in certain cases, the
appellate court may remand for a hearing in which the trial participants
give sworn testimony to determine what happened, no such procedure
generally occurs in Batson cases.
Moreover, the appellate court does not risk intruding on the trial
court's role as fact-finder in this situation. First, the "fact" that is being
decided is not one that relates to the ultimate issue in the case. That is,
while the composition of the jury is critical to the fairness of the trial, the
"fact" that is being found is not related to the underlying charge or cause
of action in the case. Second, the Batson determination differs
significantly from the typical finding of fact in that in this situation, the
finder of fact is not assessing the credibility of witnesses, but instead, the
court is required to assess both the credibility of counsel when counsel
acts as a witness and the persuasiveness of counsel's argument when
counsel acts an advocate. While the court typically makes the latter
determination, it is rarely called upon to make the former. In fact, given
their roles as officers of the court, attorneys are presumed credible."7
Because of this presumption, it is particularly important that the trial
court have concrete evidence, in the form of a video, to adequately assess
the validity of the neutral reason. Thus, the assessment is not one that is
analogous to the determination of witness credibility.
In addition, the nature of the Batson inquiry alleviates some of
the other concerns raised by appellate courts about reviewing
videorecords. First, the length of time required to review the transcript,
while perhaps longer than necessary to review a written transcript, is not
175 Shoretz, supra note 64, at 1282. ("[T]he unique nature of nonverbal errors-indeed,
their very nonverbalness-makes the application of traditional appellate procedures to review of
these gestures particularly difficult."). This problem arises because "[a]lthough court reporters
transcribe the words spoken at trial, unspoken gestures ordinarily do not appear on the record unless
specificalil noted." Id. at 1285.
7 Id. at 1285-86 (discussing People v. Maes, 607 P.2d 1028 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) and
Allen v. State, 276 So. 2d 583 (Ala. 1973)).
177 Id. at 1290 & nn.125-26. Shoretz, however, rejects this suggested solution, but does so
not on the grounds that videorecords would not provide the necessary "evidence" of prejudicial
nonverbal communication, but because the then-current problems in use of videotaping in the
courtroom would not facilitate this type of review. Id. at 1290-91. Of course, as time progresses,
these technical issues will be resolved. Id. at 1294-96.
178 See, e.g., People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 453, 459 (I11. 1989) ("The prosecutor and
defense counsel, as officers of the court, should be regarded as under a high professional obligation
to speak truthfully.").
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on the order of reviewing a videorecord on a claim of insufficient
evidence to support the verdict. That is, the voir dire is a limited portion
of the trial, easily found at the beginning of the proceedings. Courts
would not be required to fast-forward through an entire trial to locate the
relevant "evidence." Furthermore, the fact that a harmless error analysis
is generally not required alleviates much of the concern about the amount
of video to be reviewed.179
Moreover, the concerns about the time involved in reviewing
videorecords will be addressed as e-briefs"'5 become more common.''
Just as attorneys quote relevant portions from a written transcript, they
are able to insert video clips into an e-brief to relieve the court from
having to fast-forward through the tape while looking for the relevant
excerpt." 2 In addition, modem video technology is capable of generating
a searchable written transcript to accompany the videorecord. 83
Thus, as technology progresses, the vast majority of the practical
concerns regarding the use of videorecords will disappear. In addition,
the use of videorecords by the appellate courts will put some teeth into
the clear error standard. Finally, the mere fact that attorneys know that
both the trial court and appellate court will have greater "evidence" on
which to evaluate the neutral reasons will likely deter attorneys from
engaging in discriminatory behavior in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Batson's dual goals of ensuring (1) that litigants are entitled to a
jury of their peers, and (2) that citizens are permitted to serve on juries
without suffering discrimination based on race or gender are not being
served by the current methods of evaluating attorneys' neutral reasons
for striking jurors. In a recent pronouncement on Batson, upholding the
179 Although the Supreme Court has yet to directly address whether a Batson violation
necessitates reversal, that conclusion is implied in the results of Batson, Powers, Edmonson, and
J.E.B. Eric L. Muller, Solving The Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the
Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 116-17 (1996). In each of those cases, when the Court found a
violation of Batson, it reversed outright without considering the application of a harmless error
analysis. Id. at 117. State courts, however, have taken conflicting positions, with some of them
holding that a Batson violation can be harmless in certain circumstances. See id. at 116 n.148.
180 E-briefs are electronically submitted briefs, generally on CD-ROM's or DVD's, which
allow the reader to hyperlink to exhibits, cases, and even video and audio clips. See Maria Perez
Crist, The E-Brief. Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. REV. 49, 65 & n.104 (2003).
181 Numerous companies now advertise services for preparing e-briefs. See, e.g.,
HyperBrief, http://www.hyperbrief.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2008); TGL Media, Inc.,
http://www.tglmedia.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2008); National Data Support,
http://www.nationaldatasupport.com (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
182 Crist, supra note 180, at 87 n.204 ("Nor will it be necessary to set up a VCR to play a
videotaped excerpt of testimony or a live or animated filmed exhibit. By sitting at a desktop
computer in chambers or using a laptop computer anywhere, the appellate judge can work on the
hypertext brief undistracted by needing additional references not readily at hand.").
183 The federal courts and many state courts have settled on Adobe's PDF format, which
provides a searchable written transcript. Id. at 57 n.47.
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basic principles and framework, the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe
very integrity of the courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor's
discrimination invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality, and
undermines public confidence in adjudication . . ."' 4 But, the Court
noted, "[t]he rub has been the practical difficulty of ferreting out
discrimination in selections discretionary by nature, and choices subject
to myriad legitimate influences, whatever the race of the individuals on
the panel from which jurors are selected."'85 Thus, the problem in
enforcement lies in making the subjective objective; video can help by
allowing the courts at all levels to see and hear the jurors for themselves,
rather than being forced to rely on the memory, observations, and
perceptions of counsel and the trial court.
However, the use of videorecords is not a failsafe solution to the
very real problem of discrimination in jury selection. Voir dire is a
complex and often long proceeding. The ability to capture on video the
words, expressions, and mannerisms of every player in the courtroom-all
of the attorneys and the entire venire-will be a technical challenge.
Moreover, whether a juror is paying attention or making eye contact with
a questioning attorney may not always be obvious. Finally, while video
may capture actions and words, it does not capture the feeling in the
courtroom, something upon which experienced trial attorneys come to
rely. Nonetheless, reliance on videorecords is a step in the right
direction: It provides trial and appellate courts with at least some
evidence on which to base their decisions where traditionally there was
often none at all.
184 Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2324 (2005) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
185 Id.
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